As it is only by applying to space or extension, which is one and indivisible, the conceptions of number and measure, which are mere u aids of imagination,” that Ave can think of it as made up of discreet parts, so it is only Imagination which gives to ourselves and all other finite individuals a separate independent existence.


As applied to finite beings, Existence is something separable from Essence; the idea of a house in the mind, of the builder, for instance, being something different from the house as an actually existing thing.

Essence belongs to God alone; in Him essence and existence are one. When, again, we say of God that
He is one, we must understand something different from the unity we predicate of finite things.

God, beyond all predication, our intellects could say only this much that it is, but not that or how it is. “I am that I am.”

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Dualistic Theology: “not only does it start from the fundamental dualism of a super-mundane creator and a world lying outside of Him but even in that world all does not spring from the will that creates it,” (e.g. evil and sin.)

“Make thy heart a burning ground,
And let Shyama dance there.”


Every reasonable act presupposes an end or design. That design is nothing else than the form of the thing to be produced. An Intelligence capable of producing all and of raising them by a marvellous art from potentiality into actuality, must contain in itself the forms of all things.
– G. Bruno.

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In the infinite variety of existence, there must be in them along with their characteristic differences something which they all have in common, and that common element takes the place of matter as the distinctive element takes the place of form.
– Plotinus.
Anmity which transcends, yet at the same time comprehends both.

Form and Matter

I can doubt away everything, but cannot doubt the doubter: I doubt, therefore I am. Cogito, ergo sum. Descartes. I cannot abstract from the being which is identical with thought. That being is not the being of my particular self; for that, too, like every other particular contingent existence, I can, in one sense, abstract from. I can make it an object of observation. I can think of it, and I can think it away, as that which was not and might not be. But .the self from which I cannot abstract is that for which and in which I and all things are. It is that which is presupposed in all knowledge and to which all realities are relative.
Sakshi nityah samvit

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The only right we have is (Urdu word) – Rama